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Summary: Trudy Govier (FR) argues for “conditional 
unforgivability,” yet avers that we should never give up on a human 
being. She not only says it is justifiable to take a “hopeful and 
respectful attitude” toward one’s wrongdoers, she indicates that it is 
wrong not to; she says it is objectionable to adopt an attitude that any 
individual is “finally irredeemable” or “could never change,” because 
such an attitude “anticipates and communicates the worst” (137). 
Govier’s recommendation to hold a hopeful attitude seems to follow 
from one’s knowing that an appropriate object of unforgivability is 
also an agent capable of moral transformation. I appeal to Blake 
Myers-Schultz’s and Eric Schwitzgebels’ account of knowledge 
without belief, and Schwitzgebels’ account of attitudes, to argue that a 
victim’s knowledge that a wrongdoer has the capacities of a moral 
agent does not entail belief in the possibility that a wrongdoer will 
exercise those moral capacities, nor does knowledge of a wrongdoer’s 
moral capacities entail hopeful attitudes toward the prospects of an 
individual wrongdoer’s moral transformation. I conclude that what 
victims can hope for should not be that which victims are held to as a 
moral minimum.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
I first read Trudy Govier’s work on forgiveness fifteen 
years ago. Her article on “Forgiveness and the 
Unforgivable” affirmed intuitions I had hesitated to 
articulate, and provided needed support for work that 
eventually took the form of my essays for the M.A. 
degree, my Ph.D. dissertation, and, later, my first 
monograph. Over the years, I have returned to her 
compelling work again and again, to agree and to 
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disagree, to lean on her as a philosophical ally and to 
question or quarrel with her claims. I’m sure I speak for 
many of my fellow contributors when I say that her 
contributions have come to constitute part of the 
furniture of my mind. In what follows, I move quite a bit 
of that furniture around and suggest possible 
improvements to some of its joints, but my arguments 
should not be taken as reasons to throw it out – something 
I couldn’t do when I rest on it so often. Instead, I aim to 
engage in the sort of dialectical argumentation that Trudy 
Govier and I both endorse, occasionally employing 
minimal adversariality in the course of constructively 
sorting out our reasons to justify our beliefs. 
 Trudy Govier argues for the ethical importance of 
believing that moral transformation is possible for every 
individual, even unrepentant evildoers. Attitudes that hold 
anything less than belief in the possibility of others’ 
improvement are “incompatible with moral respect” for 
other human beings (FR, 137). Hers is a hopeful account 
of what every person, even one guilty of great crimes, can 
conceivably do to be a better moral agent. Govier argues 
that much hope is rational, a sentiment with which I agree 
(Hope, 240). Yet, when she is advancing the argument that 
“we should never give up on another human being” (Hope, 
140), I find more is required of her readers than agreement 
with hope’s occasional rationality. Govier’s suggestion is 
that it is not only justifiable to take and express “a 
fundamentally hopeful and respectful attitude” toward 
one’s wrongdoers, it is also objectionable to adopt an 
attitude that any individual is “completely and finally 
irredeemable” or “evil through and through and could 
never change,” because such an attitude “anticipates and 
communicates the worst” (FR, 137). Govier prescribes an 
attitude toward even unrepentant wrongdoers that 
cultivates hope for their moral transformation, implying 
that giving up hope amounts to a failure to respect them as 
human moral agents. 
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But I question whether victims of wrong fail 
morally when they have no hope for the possibility that 
wrongdoers will change. In this essay, I clarify the details 
of Govier’s rejection of belief that a wrongdoer cannot 
change, and distinguish the pessimistic belief she rejects 
from belief that a wrongdoer will not change, or that such 
a change is highly unlikely; the latter beliefs are 
compatible with what Govier calls “conditional 
unforgivability” (FR, 102). I analyze Govier’s account 
of belief in moral transformation, and her 
recommendations with respect to our attitudes toward 
wrongdoers. At times, it seems Govier argues for a 
normative expectation which may not necessarily be 
always available to victims of great harm. “Giving up,” 
depending on what kind of resolution it turns out to be, 
can be held to be compatible with normative expectations 
that victims believe in the capacity for moral 
transformation. I conclude that the complexities inherent 
in the ethics of expecting victims to cultivate normative 
attitudes in particular relationships require us to better 
articulate what attitudes are, and what victims can (and 
need not) do to cultivate them. I rely on Eric 
Schwitzgebel’s (2013) account of dispositional attitudes 
to make a case for holding that belief in the logical 
possibility of moral transformation is consistent with 
dispositional attitudes of hopelessness or despair. 
Sometimes it is reasonable to believe in another’s 
commitment to intransigence precisely because they have 
the moral capacities for wrong as well as right. 
With Govier, I believe it is both possible and 
ethical to recommend attitudes, assess attitudes, and 
expect some to be cultivated by good people. Therefore, 
in what follows, I do not disagree with Govier’s view so 
much as I develop a clearer picture of the details and 
ramifications of her view: first, I contextualize Govier’s 
account of the separability of agents from acts, then 
outline her related view of human nature as capable of 
moral transformation. I discuss her view of the appropriate 
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attitudes that others should take toward those in need of 
transforming—that is, to wrongdoers. I take up her 
argument that we should never give up on another human 
being, and I suggest that, at times, Govier bases her 
account of hopeful attitudes on the possession of beliefs in 
a way that may risk reducing attitudes to their belief-
contents. And I maintain that Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2013) 
view of dispositional attitudes allows for the moral 
permissibility of what Govier might consider “giving up” 
on another human being; I find her account of conditional 
unforgivability to be compatible with an attitude she may 
seem to hold prima facie to be morally wrong. I conclude 
with my argument that hopelessness or despairing of a 
particular wrongdoer’s moral transformation is not even 
prima facie wrong, and I attribute even more moral 
importance than Govier seems to grant to her own 
conception of conditional unforgivability, in light of its 
coherence with dispositional attitudes of hopelessness or 
giving up on the moral transformation of others. 
 
 
2.  Agents, acts, and moral transformation 
 
I start at our points of agreement; I share Govier’s related 
views that in principle, individuals are capable of moral 
transformation, and that it is correct to view human beings 
as more than, and separate from, their particular acts. What 
these two claims mean requires some contextualizing. In 
one way or another, every major contributor to the 
literature of forgiveness agrees we can separate acts from 
agents in order to discuss and appraise them. However, the 
separability of the linguistic concepts of acts and agents is 
held compatibly with a variety of views regarding the 
forgivability of individuals. Margaret Holmgren (2012), 
for example, criticizes retributive theorists who conflate 
authors of acts with their acts, “and then sit in judgment on 
the conglomerate” (93), confusing recognition-respect for 
persons with evaluative respect for their acts (90). 
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Holmgren, in contrast to retributivists, goes to the extreme 
of holding that internal attitude-cultivation can be 
absolutely separable from any facts about the wrongdoer, 
including whether or not he repents, ‘independent of his 
wrongful behaviour’ (67). Yet it is difficult for me to 
understand why, if the latter view is true, cultivation of 
forgiveness would be necessary. If the wrongness of acts 
and wrongdoers’ attitudes toward those acts are among the 
facts that are irrelevant, then there seems nothing to 
forgive. Reflecting on Holmgren’s analysis prompts me to 
conclude that the relationship of authors to their acts 
becomes so unhooked as to be meaningless. This does not 
sound like an account of forgiveness that most people 
would understand or accept.  
Eve Garrard and David McNaughton (2003) 
apparently agree with me. Against Holmgren’s view of the 
absolute separability of acts and agents, which promotes 
cultivating attitudes only to agents and never to acts, 
Garrard and McNaughton argue that “her account does not 
explain what it is to forgive someone for a particular 
offence” (2003, 8). They reject her “attitude-focused 
reasons for action,” that is, “reasons for getting oneself 
into a particular psychological state, in this case the state 
of having a forgiving attitude” (9). They instead endorse 
“object-focused reasons,” which “reveal the way in which 
the relationship that actually holds between the victim and 
the offender makes a forgiving response appropriate” (9). 
Object-focused forgiveness seems a preferable account to 
Holmgren’s, more consistent with the reasons people tend 
to forgive or withhold forgiveness; that is, they forgive 
because they have been wronged. Victims are not 
incidental to evil acts; they are victims because of what has 
been done to them. However, Garrard and McNaughton’s 
object-focused account swings too far in the other 
direction from ignoring acts altogether; their emphasis on 
attending to “the relationship that actually holds” turns out 
to be rather close-up, eyes trained on the wrong act in that 
relationship. The object on which to focus was presumably 
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the relationship, but the wrongdoing seems to be the sole 
salient fact about the relationship that Garrard and 
McNaughton consider. In other words, whereas 
Holmgren’s attitude-focused account of forgiveness 
ignores acts to focus on agents, Garrard and 
McNaughton’s object-focused approach errs in the 
direction of over-attentiveness to the wrongdoer’s act as 
the most important aspect of a relationship to the exclusion 
of other considerations, taking a close look at one thread 
and losing sight of the fabric that usually makes up 
relationships between two or more individuals. 
Govier’s account of the separability of agents and 
acts seems to hit a more plausible middle ground between 
these two positions. Like Holmgren, Govier persistently 
calls her readers’ attentions to the “person whom we 
forgive as a human being not reducible to those deeds and 
capable of something better” (FR, 110). She keeps firmly 
in view that those who commit atrocious deeds are 
properly candidates for responsive attitudes precisely 
because they are “human beings whose past lives have 
included evil,” but this is not the only fact about them in 
the relationship that actually holds; the same wrongdoers 
to whom victim stand in relation are also those “whose 
future lives are open to new choices” (112). Govier repeats 
this emphatically: human beings are individual moral 
agents “capable of deliberation, choice, and originality” 
(111). Govier’s priority of attention to our individuality 
keeps her from zeroing in on the act to the exclusion of the 
person. She argues for the logical relationship of agents 
and acts simultaneously with arguing for their thick 
contexts, saying, “When we forgive, we distinguish that 
person, the agent, from the acts, however terrible those acts 
might have been. There is a logical and ethical distinction 
between the acts and the agent who committed them” 
(110). 
Govier therefore resists “the idea of absolute 
unforgivability” (FR, 120). As she understands it, absolute 
unforgivability is constituted by a view that no conditions 
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could make it the case that a person currently unforgivable 
could be a forgivable person in the future. She rejects 
arguments for fixedness of character; whatever we hold to 
be true of an unforgivable person capable of moral agency 
can alter if they commit to moral change. One could argue 
against this position that it is acts which are unforgivable, 
but Govier’s position is that “we do not forgive deeds; we 
forgive people who have committed deeds” (109). We may 
talk of unforgivable acts in colloquial senses, but she 
persuasively argues “that description is misleading, 
because it is not deeds that would be forgiven or not 
forgiven” (109). We may read popular press accounts of 
someone guilty of murder described as a monster; 
however, if the person under discussion is a moral agent, 
then “there is not a compelling argument from the 
monstrous character of acts to the conclusion that the agent 
is a monster” (111). We know the past, but we do not know 
what the future of this person holds. We can ascertain their 
capacities for choice and deliberation, and when we find 
them, we ought to recognize that we do not know the 
future. We do not know all the choices even unrepentant 
evildoers may come to make. As Govier says in her work 
on hope, it is impossible to falsify the claim that there’s 
always some basis for hope, but we can also hope for more 
than just the abstractly possible; “hope can be reasonable 
and based on arguments for the possibility or probability 
of distinct positive outcomes” (Hope, 242). 
Govier concludes in her reasonable and argument-
based way that moral agents are capable of “moral 
transformation,” a variety of moral change based on our 
capacity “to repent and reform ourselves, and to change 
our moral character” (FR, 186n23). If one did wrong due 
to circumstances, one can change one’s circumstances or 
others could take responsibility for changing the 
circumstances. If one did wrong due to one’s decisions and 
choices, then one can effectively commit to different 
decisions and choices. “Among the many capacities and 
habits that human beings can cultivate is the ability to 
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reflect on the merits of what they are doing and work to 
change some of their actions and tendencies” (123). 
Govier’s arguments for moral transformation amount to 
arguments for the metaphysics of personhood itself; “A 
person has… the present capacity to perceive, feel, think, 
reflect on his past actions and life, make fresh decisions 
and commitments, and seek to conform his future actions 
to those fresh resolves” (125). 
Her account of personhood shows why Govier is 
“committed to the universal possibility of moral 
transformation,” and rejects absolute unforgivability. 
Because of what persons are, one can reasonably believe 
that there is something persons can do. “There are, then, 
many routes to moral transformation. Central to it will be 
the support of other people, and a philosophical pillar of 
that support is a grounded conviction that for moral agents, 
fundamental moral change is possible” (137). Govier 
recommends that we can and should believe in the 
possibility of moral transformation. Believing this is 
compatible, she adds, with “conditional unforgivability,” 
the view that current conditions hold which, if removed, 
would permit forgiveness (102). Since her account of 
forgiveness involves distinguishing an agent from his acts, 
one example of a conditionally unforgivable person is the 
unrepentant evildoer who strongly identifies with his 
wrong acts. Were he to change, to renounce his 
wrongdoing and express a new conviction that he ought to 
cultivate a different character, this would remove the 
conditions that make the person difficult to forgive (103). 
 
 
3.  Knowing, believing, and cultivating attitudes in 
giving up on another 
 
These arguments for belief in the possibility of moral 
transformation and against belief in absolute 
unforgivability are compellingly established by Govier, 
who concludes that “[w]e should never give up on another 
 
WSIA Vol. 4: Reasonable Responses pg. 182 
 
human being” (140). Attitudes that hold anything less than 
belief in the possibility of others’ improvement are 
“incompatible with moral respect” for other human beings; 
adopting the attitude that some “could never change is to 
anticipate and communicate the worst” (137). 
Interestingly, Govier holds that even if her metaphysical 
commitments to personhood are arguable, even if one can 
imagine counterexamples such as, say, “sane individuals 
who are impossible projects for moral transformation,” her 
commitment to moral transformation’s “possibility could 
[still] be defended on moral grounds alone” (137).  
Victims of serious wrongdoing may not expect this 
ethical recommendation, and may have feelings of 
pessimism and disbelief in others already settled; if so, it 
is important to note that Govier argues victims, like 
offenders, “are distinct moral agents responsible for their 
own emotions and their own lives. In the wake of 
wrongdoing, it is up to victims to handle their own feelings 
and their own lives” (65). One may have some involuntary 
emotions about one’s suffering at the hands of a 
wrongdoer, but for Govier, even if some emotions and 
beliefs are involuntary, it is not the case that all of our 
emotional experiences are involuntary. I am tempted to 
resist her suggestion that victims bear responsibility for 
how they feel, except that in the preceding pages of this 
article I happily endorsed the arguments that wrongdoers 
can commit to different convictions and attitudes 
regarding their own characters and acts. If wrongdoers can 
change their characters, attitudes, and relationships, then 
we should be open to the argument that victims of great 
harm can take some steps toward deciding to adopt 
morally respectful attitudes. Attitudes can be both 
decisional and proper objects of evaluation, as Govier 
says: “Any decision about attitudes, policies, and actions 
towards perpetrators is a decision about how to regard and 
treat human beings and must be evaluated as such” (FR, 
112). 
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I agree with Govier that for the above reasons, it is, 
at a minimum, justifiable to adopt “a fundamentally 
hopeful and respectful attitude” toward one’s wrongdoers, 
and it is reasonable to recommend that victims of 
wrongdoing who do not have such an attitude would be 
morally better actors were they to cultivate such an attitude 
toward those who wrong them. I am persuaded that it is 
good to remember that even monstrous deeds can be 
committed by persons capable of moral change, and that 
we all probably ought to cultivate attitudes which 
recognize the capacities of our wrongdoers to be and do 
better. However, I cannot endorse the view that it is 
objectionable to adopt an attitude that a particular 
individual is “completely and finally irredeemable” or 
“evil through and through and could never change,” and I 
am not convinced of the relationship between this attitude 
and the predictive expectation reflected in Govier’s 
statement that the hopeless attitude “anticipates and 
communicates the worst” (137).  
I agree with Govier’s account of personhood as 
entailing capability for moral transformation, and I see 
why she argues that we can sensibly recommend victims 
ought to know such true metaphysical propositions about 
personhood. I agree that we can even argue victims are 
wrong to believe something we have grounds to say is 
false, such as the claim that a wrongdoer’s moral 
transformation is metaphysically impossible. However, I 
would not go so far as to say that victims fail morally when 
they adopt pessimistic or hopeless attitudes about the 
prospects of their wrongdoer’s moral change. One may 
have knowledge without belief, one may have correct and 
true beliefs which are not the basis of a particular attitude, 
and one may have attitudes which are predicated on 
attitudinal content in conflict with those true beliefs. To 
defend the distinction between a victim’s knowledge of a 
proposition, a victim’s belief in a proposition, and a 
victim’s attitude toward a person, I rely on Blake Myers-
Schultz’s and Eric Schwitzgebel’s co-authored account of 
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knowledge without belief (2013). I then turn to 
Schwitzgebel’s account of dispositional attitudes “outside 
the belief box” (2013). 
Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel cite Gilbert 
Ryle’s account of ‘know’ and ‘believe’ as “dispositional 
verbs of quite disparate types. ‘Know’ is a capacity verb, 
and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for 
signifying that the person described can bring things off, 
or get things right. ‘Believe,’ on the other hand, is a 
tendency verb and one which does not connote that 
anything is brought off or got right” (quoted in Myers-
Schultz and Schwitzgebel 2013). Myers-Schultz and 
Schwitzgebel provide empirical evidence that respondents 
to thought experiments consistently distinguish between 
the same agent knowing P and (not) believing P. They 
conclude, “it is not prima facie obvious that all instances 
of knowledge are also instances of belief;” instead, “it is 
as though knowledge requires only having the information 
stored somewhere and available to be deployed to guide 
action, while belief requires some consistency in 
deploying the information (at least dispositionally or 
counterfactually)” (2013). Knowledge of a true 
proposition can be on or off. The proposition is true, or it 
is false. It does not appear that belief follows propositional 
knowledge so inevitably that one can be held responsible 
for failing at belief, however. If knowledge does not entail 
belief, then at times, the knowledge-switch will be set to 
‘on’ while the belief falters. 
Belief in the moral transformative powers of 
unrepentant evildoers starts to sound more like a virtue or 
an imperfect duty, a view with which I suspect Govier 
agrees, but which bears further investigation regarding the 
incompatibility of disbelief with moral respect for all 
persons. My efforts in the first half of this paper were 
dedicated to establishing Govier’s excellent arguments for 
a metaphysics of personhood which support the 
proposition that moral transformation is possible for 
individual human beings with moral agency. I agree with 
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the veracity of her view so much that I consider it safe to 
say I know it to be true: If moral agents are equal to the set 
of just those individuals capable of moral transformation, 
then I know moral agents are capable. This is a statement 
of equivalence packed with moral import, because its 
content is too tempting to ignore when one is in pain. If 
one is morally wronged, then one’s wrongdoer is, by 
definition, capable of moral transformation. Yet even as I 
know that, I am inclined to agree with Myers-Schultz and 
Schwitzgebel that knowledge does not entail belief, that 
the former may be a propositional bit of information while 
the latter reflects “a tendency to succeed” (Myers-Schultz 
2013). To believe is to carry one’s knowledge forward into 
situations; it is to bring it off, to get its application right in 
the presence of competing information. If so, then a failure 
to believe what I know is not a moral failure. A 
prescription regarding what victims ought to believe 
amounts to a recommendation to carry forward a practice 
which it is not entirely up to victims to succeed at tending 
to do; more importantly, it is not a moral failure in one’s 
respect for personhood, which one can know one ought to 
bear, regardless of what one believes over time. 
For related reasons, attitudes are difficult to 
contain in inner landscapes; as Schwitzgebel says, “To 
have an attitude is, at root, to live a certain way… It is to 
have, in general though probably only imperfectly, a 
certain profile of outward behavior and inner experience, 
… to embody a certain broad-ranging actual and 
counterfactual pattern of activity and reactivity” (2013). 
Attitudes are not internal representations written in a 
“Belief Box,” Schwitzgebel says, but come with postures 
and patterns of behavior in the world, and he argues this 
account for both propositional attitudes (in the set of which 
he includes believing and hoping) and reactive attitudes (in 
the set of which he includes resenting, forgiving, and being 
angry). If knowledge does not entail belief, then belief 
does not entail appropriate attitudes, and Schwitzgebel 
rejects as ‘misleading’ the view that an attitude is “a matter 
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of possessing some particular internally stored 
representational content, a content perhaps poised to play 
some specific set of cognitive roles depending on the 
attitude type.” Instead of holding that to have an attitude is 
to have a relationship to a belief, Schwitzgebel argues that 
to have an attitude is to have, “though probably only 
imperfectly, a certain profile of outward behavior and 
inner experience… to embody a certain broad-ranging 
actual and counterfactual pattern of activity and reactivity” 
(2013). 
I do not imagine that Govier would disagree 
overmuch with this description of attitudes, as correlative 
and not coextensive with one’s knowledge and one’s 
beliefs, in light of Govier’s brief but sensitive depiction of 
conditional unforgivability. Her view of this attitude 
appears to be entirely compatible with the way that 
Schwitzgebel characterizes attitudes: 
 
There are indeed enormous psychological and moral 
obstacles to the forgiveness of very serious wrongs. 
These obstacles stem both from the appalling nature 
of those wrongs and from the cruel suffering of the 
victims. When atrocities are committed, the insults to 
humanity and moral principles is profound and deeply 
disturbing. In such a context, it is difficult to gain a 
sense of the wrongdoer as a person, difficult to 
comprehend how anyone could do such things… It 
may be virtually impossible for ‘ordinary people’ to 
feel empathy with such offenders – even though there 
is in the end some basis of common humanity. We 
may rightly regard a perpetrator as conditionally 
unforgivable if that perpetrator has not 
acknowledged, and does not morally regret, the 
wrongdoing…Failure to forgive perpetrators in these 
circumstances expresses our conviction that those 
acts, and any person still identified with them, are 
profoundly evil. To deny sympathy and empathy to 
such perpetrators, to wish to disassociate ourselves 
from them and avoid any implication that we might 
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condone those acts is an understandable human 
response. (FR, 117-118) 
 
In this passage, Govier’s account of conditional 
unforgivability is entirely consistent with Schwitzgebel’s 
account of dispositional attitudes; patterns of activity and 
reactivity are understood in a context in which a particular 
victim responds to a particular wrongdoer.  
However, it now seems that a victim with the 
attitude of conditional unforgivability is not doing 
something objectionable; holding an attitude that someone 
is conditionally unforgivable seems highly compatible 
with the reasoning of a victim of atrocity who knows that 
persons are capable of moral transformation, but does not, 
at this time, believe this wrongdoer capable of it. The 
attitude that the perpetrator of an atrocity is hopelessly 
committed to unrepentant disregard, and offers one no 
prospects for believing otherwise, no longer seems to 
“presume that he is nothing more – and is worth nothing 
more – than his wrongful deeds,” even if the victim does 
assume that a particular unrepentant is never going to 
change (FR, 64). It seems unreasonable of us to expect 
hope from a victim of wrongdoing that a particularly 
unrepentant evildoer will exercise capacities for moral 
transformation. The knowledge that he can change does 
not entail that it is false to believe that he will never 
change, or to adopt an attitude that it is hopeless, that one’s 
ongoing ways of living in the world simply cannot include 
the unrepentant evildoer. As Margaret Urban Walker 
(2006) says, hope can “die the natural death of exhaustion 
in the face of waning possibilities,” and can even be killed 
(59). Walker identifies “hope’s points of vulnerability,” 
including “the real possibility (non-zero probability, less 
than certainty) of what is hoped for” (60), and here I take 
her to include not only normative expectations that humans 
can act as moral agents, but predictive expectations as 
well.  
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Govier’s moral grounds for rejecting absolute 
unforgivability rest rightly on metaphysical accounts of 
personhood as well as normative expectations that we 
correctly hold people responsible for acting as we know 
they can and should. The practices of belief and attitude, 
however, are concrete and specific to particular 
relationships with individual wrongdoers, and one that 
announces his commitment to carry on unrepentantly 
wishing he’d finished the job of killing a victim’s family 
gives the victim evidence of waning possibilities. The 
belief that all humans are capable of moral transformation, 
the normative expectation based on a reliable proposition, 
can in particular cases be held compatibly with adopting 
an attitude that an actual, particular wrongdoer is never 
going to change. I hold this is not a failure of respect for 
his moral agency. Instead, it is a dispositional attitude that 
informs the way this victim lives in the world; it may take 
the form of disassociating with this person, denying him 
sympathy, or refusing condonation of his acts, because of 
one’s predictive expectations and not one’s normative 
expectations. What I am attempting to describe is a form 
of relational hopelessness which gives up on another 
human being, not because one no longer believes he has 
capacities, but because one sees no prospects that he will 
exercise them in one’s lifetime. What we can hope for is 
not that which we should be held to as a moral minimum. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion: Believing in, while giving up 
 
What do we do when we give up on another human being? 
I mean that literally: What do we do? Our actions informed 
by adopting a despairing attitude toward the moral 
transformation of an individual are hard to distinguish 
from the actions Govier describes as justifiable in the 
context of conditional unforgivability. Imagine that I 
despair of former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney ever 
coming around to seeing that his conduct and priorities are 
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morally bad. He is not getting any younger, and in fact is 
closer to the average age of death than I am. He routinely 
continues to appear on television broadcasts and oppose 
everything from conservation of electricity to feeding 
starving people. My responses to him include avoiding 
his broadcasts, expressing rejection of his views, and 
denying him the sympathy that I give to others. Am I 
conditionally despairing of him, while retaining a belief in 
his potential for moral change? I do not believe my 
attitude toward him is a failure of moral respect for his 
personhood. I believe that I have powerful predictive 
expectations that he will never change because he offers 
me a wealth of experience and evidence. I despair of 
improvement in my attitude toward him, but I know that 
he is a capable moral agent. If I didn’t know and believe 
this, I would not resent his continued broadcasting of his 
views as much as I do. Yet I pronounce myself a believer 
in the proposition that he will never change in the short 
time left to him on this earth. I adopt an attitude which 
ceases to look toward the future. 
 
 I do not intend the forgoing to amount to a 
recommendation for hopelessness with respect to the 
prospects of all wrongdoers’ moral capacities. With 
Govier, I believe that a receptivity to the possibilities of 
living together in the future is key to peace. However, I do 
not believe the forward-looking attitude of hopefulness 
that others will exercise their moral capacities is always 
necessary. Optimistic beliefs and hopeful attitudes are 
not a lways  necessary for moral  motivation, and 
indeed, some philosophers argue for a healthy pessimism 
that looks away from predictive expectations in order to 
focus on other goods. One firmly endorsed view of 
pessimism does not look to outcomes or progress, and 
instead “asks us to philosophize in its absence” (Dienstag 
2009, 18). My own sentiments are captured in the 
statement that “peacemaking is always specific” (Ruddick 
1995, 139). Our attitudes toward a particular evildoer 
 
WSIA Vol. 4: Reasonable Responses pg. 190 
 
occur alongside our attitudes toward how we are living 
with others and with ourselves. What we know, believe 
and hope may all promote our abilities to continue the 
perpetual struggle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
